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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a rateless codes-based communication protocol to provide security
for wireless systems. In the proposed protocol, a source uses the transmit antenna selection (TAS)
technique to transmit Fountain-encoded packets to a destination in presence of an eavesdropper.
Moreover, a cooperative jammer node harvests energy from radio frequency (RF) signals of the
source and the interference sources to generate jamming noises on the eavesdropper. The data
transmission terminates as soon as the destination can receive a sufficient number of the encoded
packets for decoding the original data of the source. To obtain secure communication, the destination
must receive sufficient encoded packets before the eavesdropper. The combination of the TAS
and harvest-to-jam techniques obtains the security and efficient energy via reducing the number
of the data transmission, increasing the quality of the data channel, decreasing the quality of the
eavesdropping channel, and supporting the energy for the jammer. The main contribution of this
paper is to derive exact closed-form expressions of outage probability (OP), probability of successful
and secure communication (SS), intercept probability (IP) and average number of time slots used
by the source over Rayleigh fading channel under the joint impact of co-channel interference and
hardware impairments. Then, Monte Carlo simulations are presented to verify the theoretical results.
Keywords: rateless codes; transmit antenna selection; energy harvesting; co-channel interference;
hardware impairments
1. Introduction
Physical-layer security (PLS) [1–4] has attracted much attention of the researchers as an efficient
method to attain security. Due to the simple implementation, i.e., only exploiting characteristics
of wireless medium such as link distance and channel state information (CSI), PLS can be
implemented efficiently in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), internet-of-things (IoT) networks,
etc. [5–8]. To enhance the secrecy performance, diversity transmission methods can be employed.
In [9–12], MIMO-based transmit–receive methods such as Transmit Antenna Selection-Maximal Ratio
Combining (TAS-MRC), Maximal Ratio Transmission-MRC (MRT-MRC), MRT-Selection Combining
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(MRT-SC), MRT-SC were proposed and analyzed. In addition, performance of secure communication
protocols can be also enhanced with cooperative relaying methods [13–16]. In [17–20], the authors
proposed cooperative jamming (CJ) techniques to reduce quality of the eavesdropping channels, where
friendly jammers are employed to generate artificial noises on the eavesdropper, and the legitimate
receivers have to cooperate with the jammers to remove the interference in the received signals.
The results presented that the schemes which combine the diversity transmission and the jamming
techniques outperform the conventional cooperative ones without using CJ. However, energy efficiency
may become a critical issue when the jammer nodes continuously transmit the artificial noises by
using their own energy. Recently, radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting (EH) is an efficient method
to prolong lifetime for wireless networks [21–24]. Particularly, the wireless devices can harvest energy
from full-energy nodes [21,22] or from power stations deployed in networks [25,26] or even from
co-channel interferences caused by outside sources [27,28]. References [20,29] proposed and analyzed
performance of RF-EH-based secure communication protocols. To support energy for the jammer
nodes, the authors of [20,29] proposed harvest-to-jam (HJ) methods, where the cooperative jammers
harvest energy from the RF signals, and then use it to generate artificial noises.
Rateless codes or Fountain codes (FCs) [30–33] have drawn much attention due to their simple
implementation. In FCs, a transmitter uses Fountain encoder to generate a limitless number of encoded
packets, and then transmit them to intended receivers. If the receivers can receive a sufficient number
of the encoded packets, they can recover the original message of the transmitter. Due to broadcast of
the wireless channels, the encoded packets can be overheard by eavesdroppers. Therefore, the security
becomes a critical issue for the FCs-based communication systems. Recently, some published works
considering the secure communication protocols with FCs have been reported in [34–36]. In [34],
the authors proposed a secure delivery scheme, in which the security can be achieved if the legitimate
user receives enough Fountain packets before the eavesdropper. In [35], a dynamic Fountain-encoded
at a transmitter was proposed to enhance the data security. The authors of [36] proposed a FC-based
cooperative relay protocol. In [36], the source and the jammer cooperate to remove the interference
components in the received signals at the destination. Reference [37] proposed an efficient FCs-based
multicast scenario to achieve security for Internet of Things (IoT) systems.
In this paper, we propose a FCs based secure communication protocol, where a multi-antenna
source selects its best antenna to transmit the encoded packets to a single-antenna destination,
in presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper who attempts to overhear the source information.
When the destination can receive sufficient encoded packets for decoding the original data, it would
send a feedback to the source to terminate the transmission. As a result, to obtain the secure
transmission, the destination must receive a sufficient number of the encoded packets before the
eavesdropper. Otherwise, the original information is intercepted. The main contributions of this paper
can be summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we first propose the FCs based communication protocol using the
harvest-to-jam based cooperative jamming technique to reduce the quality of the eavesdropping
link. Different with [34–37], we propose a cooperative jamming technique, where a cooperative
jammer node harvests energy from the RF signals of the source and the interference sources to
generate noises to the eavesdropper. Different with our previous works [38,39], in the proposed
protocol, there exist interference sources in the network that cause co-channel interferences on
both the destination and the eavesdropper.
• Until now, almost published works related to secrecy performance evaluation have assumed
that the transceiver hardware of the wireless devices is perfect. However, in practice, it is not
perfect due to phase noise, I/Q imbalance (IQI), amplifier non-linearity [40–43]. In this paper,
the joint impact of hardware noises and co-channel interference on the system performances
is investigated.
• For performance evaluation, we derive exact closed-form expressions of outage probability (OP),
probability of successful and secure communication (SS), intercept probability (IP) and average
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number of the time slots used by the source over Rayleigh fading channel. The closed-form
formulas are easy-to-compute, and hence they can be easily used to design and optimize
the considered system. In addition, all of the derived expressions are verified by Monte
Carlo simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model of the proposed protocols is
described in Section 2. In Section 3, we evaluate performance of the proposed scheme. The simulation
results are shown in Section 4. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section 5.
2. System Model
Figure 1 illustrates the system model of the proposed protocol, where the source node (S)
equipped with M antennas communicates with the single-antenna destination (D), in presence of
the single-antenna eavesdropper (E) who attempts to overhear the source data. All of the receivers
such as D and E are suffered from co-channel interference caused by K ambient sources (denoted by
I1, I2, ..., IK). To reduce the quality of the eavesdropping link, the cooperative jamming technique can
be used, where the single antenna jammer (J) is employed to continuously generate the artificial noises
to E. We assume that the nodes D and J are close with each other so that D can remove the co-channel
interference generated by J [38]. Moreover, the jammer (J) uses the energy harvested from the RF
signals of the source and the interference sources for transmitting the jamming signals.
S
D
E
J
K
K
K
M
Figure 1. System model of the proposed scheme.
The source divides its original data into L packets which are encoded appropriately to create the
encoded packets. Then, at each time slot, the source uses the TAS technique to send each encoded
packet to the destination. At the same time, the eavesdropper tries to receive the encoded packet.
The destination and the eavesdropper are assumed to be able to successfully obtain the original data
if they can correctly receive at least H encoded packets, where H = (1+ ε) L, and ε is the decoding
overhead which depends on concrete code design. Moreover, after the destination receives sufficient
number of the encoded packets, it will send an ACK message to inform the source to stop the data
transmission. In this case, if the eavesdropper cannot obtain enough number of the encoded packets,
it cannot obtain the source data. Otherwise, the original data of the source will be intercepted.
Let us consider the data transmission at an arbitrary time slot. Let hSmD, hSmE and hSmJ denote
channel coefficients between the mth antenna of the source and the nodes D, E and J, respectively,
where m = 1, 2, ..., M. We also denote hIkD, hIkE, hIkJ and hJE as channel gains of the Ik → D, Ik → E,
Ik → J and J→ E links, respectively, where k = 1, 2, ...,K. We assume that all of the link channels are
block and flat Rayleigh fading which keeps constant in a time slot but independently changes over
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time slots. Therefore, the channel gains γXY = |hXY|2, (X, Y ∈ {Sm, D, E, J, Ik}) are exponential random
variables (RVs) whose cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF)
are given, respectively as
FγXY (z) = 1− exp (−λXYx) ,
fγXY (z) = λXY exp (−λXYx) , (1)
where λXY is a parameter of γXY, i.e., λXY = 1/E {γXY} , and E {.} is an expected operator.
We can assume that the RVs γSmD
(
γSmE,γSmJ
)
are independent and identical, i.e., λSmD = λSD(
λSmE = λSE,λSmJ = λSJ
)
for all m. On the contrary, the RVs γIkD
(
γIkE,γIkJ
)
are assumed
to be independent and non-identical, i.e., λIkD 6= λIlD
(
λIkE 6= λIlE,λIkJ 6= λIlJ
)
as k 6= l,
where l ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
With the TAS technique, the source selects the best transmit antenna to send the encoded packet
to the destination, using the following method:
b = arg max
m=1,2,...,M
(γSmD) , (2)
where b ∈ {1, 2, ..., M}.
Moreover, the CDF of γSbD can be obtained as
FγSbD (x) = Pr
(
max
m=1,2,...,M
(γSmD) < x
)
= [1− exp (−λSDx)]M
= 1+
M
∑
m=1
(−1)mCmM exp (−mλSDx), (3)
where CmM = M!/m!/ (M−m)! is a binomial coefficient.
Let us denote T as a block time of each time slot: a duration of αT (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) is used for the
jammer node to harvest the energy from the source and the interference sources, and the remaining
time ((1− α)T) is spent for the data transmission. Then, the energy harvested by the jammer is
expressed as
EH = ηαT
(
PSγSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
PIkγIkJ
)
, (4)
where η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) is an energy conversion efficiency, PS and PIk are transmit power of the source (S)
and the interference sources Ik, respectively.
Next, the average transmit power of the jammer used for the data transmission phase can be
formulated by
PJ =
EH
(1− α)T = χ
(
PSγSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
PIkγIkJ
)
, (5)
where χ = ηα/ (1− α).
It is worth noting that the implementation of the TAS method is simpler than that of the MRT
method because it only requires the index of the best antenna which can be feed-backed by the
destination (not feedback all of the channel state information (CSI) as in MRT). Moreover, the best
transmit antenna selection can be performed before the EH phase, and the time used for this process
can be ignored as compared with the EH and packet transmission phases. Finally, the source uses
the selected antenna during each time slot for both the EH and data transmission purposes due to
scheduling issues, e.g., the source uses the remaining antennas to serve other destinations.
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Let us denote U as the length of each encoded packet. If the source sends the signal
xS [l] (l = 1, 2, ...,U) to the destination, the received signals at the destination and the eavesdropper
can be expressed, respectively as
yD =
√
PShSbD (xS [l] + νD [l]) +
√
PJhJDxJ [l] +
K
∑
k=1
√
PIkhIkDxIk [l] + nD [l],
yE =
√
PShSbE (xS [l] + νE [l]) +
√
PJhJExJ [l] +
K
∑
k=1
√
PIkhIkExIk [l] + nE [l], (6)
where l = 1, 2, ...,U, νD [l] and νE [l] are hardware noises caused by impairments, xJ [l] and xIk [l] are
signals transmitted by the nodes J and Ik, respectively, and nD [l] and nE [l] are additive white Gaussian
noises (AWGNs) at D and E, respectively. The hardware noises νD [l] and νE [l] can be modeled as
Gaussian RVs with zero-mean and variances of κ2D and κ
2
E, respectively, where κ
2
D and κ
2
E is total
hardware impairment levels of the Sb → D and Sb → E links, respectively.
Because the nodes D and J are close with each other so that we can assume that D knows xJ [l],
hJD and PJ via securely exchanging local messages with J. Therefore, D can remove the interference
component
√
PJhJDxJ [l] from the received signal yD. Once D can perfectly remove the interference,
the instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) received by the destination under joint
impact of co-channel interference and hardware impairments can be formulated as [44]
ΨD =
PSγSbD
κ2DPSγSbD +
K
∑
k=1
PIkγIkD + N0
=
QSγSbD
κ2DQSγSbD +
K
∑
k=1
QIkγIkD + 1
, (7)
where N0 is variance of additive noises nD [l] which are assumed to be same at all of the receivers,
QS = PS/N0 and QIk = PIk/N0.
Because the eavesdropper cannot remove the jamming signals, the instantaneous SINR obtained
at this node is given as
ΨE =
PSγSbE
κ2EPSγSbE + PJγJE +
K
∑
k=1
PIkγIkD + N0
. (8)
Substituting (5) into (8), we obtain
ΨE =
QSγSbE
κ2EQSγSbE + χ
(
QSγSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
QIkγIkJ
)
γJE +
K
∑
k=1
QIkγIkE + 1
. (9)
Next, we can give expressions of the data rate for the data and eavesdropping links, respectively by
CD = (1− α)Tlog2 (1+ΨD) ,
CE = (1− α)Tlog2 (1+ΨE) . (10)
Assume that each encoded packet can be decoded successfully if the achievable data rate is higher
than a predetermined target rate (denoted by Cth). Otherwise, the encoded packet cannot be received
correctly. Hence, the probability that the destination cannot receive one encoded packet correctly is
formulated as
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Pr (CD < Cth) = Pr (ΨD < θth)
∆
= ρD, (11)
where
θth = 2
Cth
(1−α)T − 1. (12)
Note that the probability of the successful decoding for one encoded packet at D is
Pr (CD ≥ Cth) = 1− ρD. Similarly, the probability that one encoded packet can be received correctly
and incorrectly by the eavesdropper is given, respectively as
Pr (CE < Cth) = Pr (ΨE < θth)
∆
= ρE,
Pr (CE ≥ Cth) = Pr (ΨE ≥ θth) = 1− ρE. (13)
Considering a delay-constrained system where the maximum number of time slots that can be
used for transmitting the encoded packets is limited by Nth (Nth ≥ H). This means that the destination
cannot recover the original data if it cannot successfully receive H encoded packets within Nth time
slots. Let us denote NS (H ≤ NS ≤ Nth) as the number of time slots used by the source (or the number
of the encoded packets sent by the source), ND and NE as the number of the encoded packets received
by the nodes D and E, respectively, after the source stops its transmission. Then, the outage probability
(OP) at the destination is formulated by
OP = Pr (ND < H|NS = Nth) . (14)
Next, the probability that the source-destination transmission is successful and secure (SS) is
defined as
SS = Pr (ND = H, NE < H|NS ≤ Nth) . (15)
Equation (15) implies that the destination can receive sufficient number of the encoded packets
(ND = H) before the eavesdropper (NE < H) when the number of time slots used is less than or equal
to Nth (NS ≤ Nth).
Let us consider the intercept probability (IP) defined as the probability that the eavesdropper can
obtain H encoded packets before or at same time with the destination:
IP = Pr (NE = H, ND ≤ H|NS ≤ Nth) . (16)
We note from (16) that when the eavesdropper obtains H encoded packets, it does not need to
receive more encoded packets, regardless of whether the source will transmit the encoded packets in
the next time slots. Instead, it will start to decode the original data of the source. Finally, we study the
average number of the time slots used to transmit encoded packets to the destination, which can be
formulated by
TS =
H−1
∑
v=0
Nth Pr (ND = v|NS = Nth) +
Nth
∑
t=H
t Pr (ND = H|NS = t). (17)
In (17), Pr (ND = v|NS = Nth) is the probability that the number of the encoded packets received
at the destination is v (0 ≤ v < H) when the source used Nth time slots (the destination is in outage),
and Pr (ND = H|NS = t) is the probability that D can obtain sufficient number of the encoded packets
within t time slots, where H ≤ t ≤ Nth (the data transmission is successful).
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3. Performance Analysis
3.1. Derivations of ρD and ρE
Proposition 1. If 1− κ2Dθth ≤ 0, then ρD = 1, and if 1− κ2Dθth > 0, ρD can be expressed by an exact
closed-form formula as
ρD = 1+
M
∑
m=1
(−1)mCmM exp (−mλSDω0)
K
∏
k=1
λIkD
λIkD +mλSDωk
. (18)
Proof. See the proof and notations in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. If 1− κ2Eθth ≤ 0, then ρE = 1, and if 1− κ2Eθth > 0, we can obtain an exact closed-form
expression of ρE as
ρE = 1−
(
K
∏
k=1
λIkE
λIkE + λSEϑk
)
exp (−λSEϑ0)
×
[
λJEΩSJ
λSE
β0 exp
(
λJEΩSJ
λSE
)
E1
(
λJEΩSJ
λSE
)
+
K
∑
k=1
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
βk exp
(
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
)
E1
(
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
)]
. (19)
Proof. See the proof and notations in Appendix B.
In case where α = 0, Equation (19) reduces to
ρE = 1−
(
K
∏
k=1
λIkE
λIkE + λSEϑk
)
exp (−λSEϑ0) . (20)
3.2. Analysis of Outage Probability (OP)
As defined in (14), an exact closed-form expression of OP can be provided as follows:
OP =
H−1
∑
ND=0
CNDNth(1− ρD)
ND(ρD)
Nth−ND . (21)
It is noted from (21) that the possible values of ND are from 0 to H− 1, and there are CNDNth possible
cases for each value of ND.
3.3. Analysis of Successful and Secure Communication (SS)
From (15), we can rewrite SS by
SS =
Nth
∑
u=H
Pr (ND = H|NS = u)×
H−1
∑
t=0
Pr (NE = t|NS = u). (22)
In (22), Pr (ND = H|NS = u) is the probability that the destination can correctly receive H encoded
packets when the number of time slots used is u. Since the data transmission between the source and
the destination ends in the u−th time slot, Pr (ND = H|NS = u) is given as
Pr (ND = H|NS = u) = Cu−Hu−1 (1− ρD)H(ρD)u−H . (23)
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Moreover, Pr (NE = t|NS = u) in (22) presents the probability that the number of encoded packets
obtained at the eavesdropper is t. Similar to (21), we have
Pr (NE = t|NS = u) = Ctu(1− ρE)t(ρE)u−t. (24)
Substituting (23) and (24) into (22), an exact closed-form expression of SS can be given as
SS =
Nth
∑
u=H
Cu−Hu−1 (1− ρD)H(ρD)u−H ×
H−1
∑
t=0
Ctu(1− ρE)t(ρE)u−t. (25)
3.4. Analysis of Intercept Probability (IP)
The intercept probability (IP) in (16) is given by
IP =
Nth
∑
u=H
Pr (NE = H|NS = u)×
[
Pr (ND = H|NS = u) +
H−1
∑
v=0
Pr (ND = v|NS = u)
]
. (26)
In (26), Pr (NE = H|NS = u) is the probability that the eavesdropper can receive sufficient number
of the encoded packets in u time slots, which can be calculated similarly to (23) as
Pr (NE = H|NS = u) = Cu−Hu−1 (1− ρE)H(ρE)u−H . (27)
Next, Pr (ND = H|NS = u) in (26) is calculated by (23), and Pr (ND = v|NS = u) in (26) can be
obtained by
Pr (ND = v|NS = u) = Cvu(1− ρD)v(ρD)u−v. (28)
Plugging (23), (26), (27) and (28) together, we obtain
IP =
Nth
∑
u=H
Cu−Hu−1 (1− ρE)H(ρE)u−H ×
[
Cu−Hu−1 (1− ρD)H(ρD)u−H +
H−1
∑
v=0
Cvu(1− ρD)v(ρD)u−v
]
. (29)
3.5. Analysis of Average Number of Time Slots (TS)
Similarly, the probability Pr (ND = v|NS = Nth) and Pr (ND = H|NS = t) in (17) can be calculated
respectively as
Pr (ND = v|NS = Nth) = CvNth(1− ρD)
v(ρD)
Nth−H ,
Pr (ND = H|NS = t) = Ct−Ht−1 (1− ρD)H(ρD)t−H . (30)
Substituting (30) into (17), we obtain an exact closed-form formula for the average number of
time slots used by the source as
TS = Nth
H−1
∑
v=0
CvNth(1− ρD)
v(ρD)
Nth−v +
Nth
∑
t=H
tCt−Ht−1 (1− ρD)H(ρD)t−H . (31)
4. Simulation Results
In this section, Monte Carlo simulations are presented to verify the theoretical results.
For illustration purpose, in all of the simulations, we fix the required number of the encoded packets
by 10 (H = 10), the energy conversion efficiency by 1 (η = 1), the total block time by 1 (T = 1),
the number of the interference sources by 3 (K = 3), the parameters of the interference links by
λI1D = λI1E = λI1J = 3, λI2D = λI2E = λI2J = 4 and λI3D = λI3E = λI3J = 5, and the parameters of
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the remaining links by 1
(
λSD = λSE = λSJ = λJE = 1
)
. In the figures, the simulation and theoretical
results are denoted by Sim and Theo, respectively.
In Figure 2, we present the probability ρD and ρE as a function of QS in dB. In this figure,
the number of antenna equipped by the source is set to 3 (M = 3), the fraction of time allocated for
the EH phase is fixed by 0.3 (α = 0.3), the hardware impairment levels are assigned by κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.1,
and the target rate is set to 0.75 (Cth = 0.75). It can be seen from Figure 2 that ρD and ρE decrease with
the increasing of QS and the decreasing of QI. However, ρD is much smaller than ρE at medium and
high QS regimes. We also obverse that the simulation and theoretical results are in good agreement,
which validates our derivations.
0 5 10 15 20
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
QS (dB)
ρ D
 
(ρ E
)
 
 
ρD (Sim, QI = 5 dB)
ρD (Sim, QI = 10 dB)
ρD (Sim, QI = 15 dB)
ρD (Theo)
ρE (Sim, QI = 5 dB)
ρE (Sim, QI = 10 dB)
ρE (Sim, QI = 15 dB)
ρE (Theo)
Figure 2. ρD and ρE as a function of QS in dB when M = 3, α = 0.3, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.1 and Cth = 0.75.
Figure 3 presents outage performance of the proposed protocol as a function of QS in dB with
QI = 7.5 dB, M = 2, α = 0.1, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0 and Cth = 1. It is shown in Figure 3 that the impact of the
co-channel interference on the performance is negative, i.e., the value of OP is very high at low QS
regimes. In particularly, when the value of QS is lower than that of QI, OP is almost equal to 1. We can
also observe that the outage performance is better with high value of Nth because the source has more
time slots to transmit the encoded packets to the destination.
0 5 10 15 20
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
QS (dB)
O
P
 
 
Sim (Nth = 10)
Sim (Nth = 11)
Sim (Nth = 12)
Theo
Figure 3. OP as a function of QS in dB when QI = 7.5 dB, M = 2, α = 0.1, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0 and Cth = 1.
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In Figure 4, we present the value of SS as a function of QS in dB when QI = 10 dB , α = 0.1,
κ2D = 0.1, κ
2
E = 0, Nth = 20 and Cth = 1.5. We can see that the proposed protocol obtains higher value of
SS when more antennas are equipped at the source. It is also seen that when M = 1, the SS performance
is significantly degraded because no transmit diversity gain is obtained. Moreover, SS also increases
as increasing QS. It is due to the fact that at high QS values, the destination almost obtains sufficient
number of the encoded packets before the eavesdropper. However, it can be seen from Figure 4 that
when the value of QS is very high, the value of SS slightly decreases due to high overhearing possibility
of the eavesdropper. Moreover, the SS performance in all values of M(M > 1) is almost same at high
QS regimes.
10 15 20 25
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
QS (dB)
SS
 
 
Sim (M=1)
Sim (M=2)
Sim (M=3)
Sim (M=4)
Theo
Figure 4. SS as a function of QS in dB when QI = 10 dB, α = 0.1, κ2D = 0.1, κ
2
D = 0, Nth = 20 and
Cth = 1.5.
In Figure 5, the value of SS is presented as a function of α when QS = QI = 15 dB, M = 3,
κ2E = 0.1, Nth = 15 and Cth = 0.7. As we can see, the performance significantly degrades with high
hardware impairment levels of the data links, i.e., κ2D is high. Moreover, we can observe from that the
fraction of time allocated for the EH phase impacts on the value of SS. It can be seen that there exists
an optimal value of α at which the value of SS is highest.
In Figure 6, the intercept probability of the proposed protocol is presented as a function of M
when QS = QI = 20 dB, κ2D = 0.2, α = 0.3, Nth = 20 and Cth = 0.5. As we can see, the value of
IP decreases when more antennas are equipped at the source. Also, IP is lower when the hardware
impairment level of the eavesdropping links is high.
Figure 7 investigates impact of Nth on the intercept probability as QS = QI = 20 dB, M = 2,
κ2D = κ
2
E = 0, and Cth = 0.5. It can be seen that the value of IP is higher when the number of Nth
increases. However, when the number of Nth is high enough, IP converges to a constant. As expected,
IP is lower when more time used for the EH phase (because the transmit power of the jammer is higher).
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Figure 5. SS as a function of α when QS = QI = 15 dB, M = 3, κ2E = 0.1, Nth = 15 and Cth = 0.7.
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Figure 6. IP as a function of M when QS = QI = 20 dB, κ2D = 0.2, α = 0.3, Nth = 20 and Cth = 0.5.
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Figure 7. IP as a function of Nth when QS = QI = 20 dB, M = 2, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0 and Cth = 0.5.
Figure 8 presents OP and IP as a function of α when QS = QI = 15 dB, M = 4, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0
and Nth = 16. We can see that there exists a trade-off between OP and IP. Indeed, OP increases
when increasing the value of α, while IP decreases with higher value of α. We can also see that when
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Cth = 0.8, OP is below 10−3 when the value of α is higher than (about) 0.15, but the intercept probability
is higher than 2.5× 10−3. In addition, OP significantly decreases as decreasing the value of Cth.
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Figure 8. OP and IP as a function of α when QS = QI = 15 dB, M = 4, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0 and Nth = 16.
Figure 9 shows the trade-off between OP and IP when QS = QI = 15 dB, M = 3, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.1
and Cth = 0.75. As we can observe, when the cooperative jamming technique is not used (α = 0),
the OP value is lower but the IP one is higher. Similarly, to increase the reliability of the data
transmission, we can increase the number of Nth. However, the intercept possibility of the eavesdropper
also increases with higher value of Nth.
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Figure 9. OP and IP as a function of Nth when QS = QI = 15 dB, M = 3, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.1 and Cth = 0.75.
In Figure 10, we present average number of the time slots as a function of QS in dB when
QI = 10 dB, α = 0.2, κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.05, Nth = 17 and Cth = 1. We see that the number of time slots
used decreases when increasing the number of antennas and the transmit power of the source. It is
also seen that as the source has a single antenna (M = 1), the average number of time slots is much
higher. Moreover, reducing the number of time slots means reducing the delay time and transmit
power, which are an important metric of wireless communication systems.
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Figure 10. Average number of time slots as a function of QS in dB when QI = 10 dB, α = 0.2,
κ2D = κ
2
E = 0.05, Nth = 17 and Cth = 1.
From Figures 3–10, it is worth noting that the theoretical results and simulation results are in good
agreement which validates the theoretical derivations.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed an FC-based MISO scheme using the TAS and EH-based cooperative
jamming techniques for the secure communication under the joint impact of hardware impairments
and co-channel interference. The performance of the proposed scheme such as outage probability (OP),
probability of successful and secure communication (SS), intercept probability (IP) and average number
of the time slots was evaluated via both simulation and theory. The results presented that the hardware
impairment levels, the co-channel interference, the fraction of time allocated for the EH phase and the
number of transmit antennas at the source significantly impact on the system performance. Moreover,
there exists a trade-off between the security and reliability, i.e., between OP and IP. Finally, the fraction
of time allocated for the EH phase should be designed appropriately to optimize system performance.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
From (7) and (11), we obtain
ρD = Pr
 QSγSbD
κ2DQSγSbD +
K
∑
k=1
QIkγIkD + 1
< θth

= Pr
((
1− κ2Dθth
)
QSγSbD <
K
∑
k=1
QIkθthγIkD + θth
)
. (A1)
From (A1), we observe that if 1− κ2Dθth ≤ 0, then ρD = 1; and if 1− κ2Dθth > 0, we can rewrite (A1)
as
ρD = Pr
(
γSbD <
K
∑
k=1
ωkγIkD +ω0
)
, (A2)
where
ω0 =
θth(
1− κ2Dθth
)
QS
, ωk =
θthQIk(
1− κ2Dθth
)
QS
. (A3)
Moreover, Equation (A2) can be rewritten by
ρD =
∫ +∞
0
...
∫ +∞
0
FγSbD
(
K
∑
k=1
ωkxk +ω0
)
fγI1D (x1) ... fγIKD (xK)dx1...dxK. (A4)
Using the CDF obtained by (3), we have
FγSbD
(
K
∑
k=1
ωkxk +ω0
)
= 1+
M
∑
m=1
(−1)mCmM exp (−mλSDω0) exp
(
−mλSD
K
∑
k=1
ωkxk
)
. (A5)
Substituting (A5) and the PDF of γIkD in (1); after some manipulations, we can obtain (18),
and finish the proof here.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
Combining (9) and (13), we have
ρE = Pr
((
1− κ2Eθth
)
QSγSbE < χθth
(
QSγSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
QIkγIkJ
)
γJE + θth
K
∑
k=1
QIkγIkE + θth
)
. (A6)
We observe from (A6) that if 1− κ2Eθth ≤ 0, then ρE = 1, and if 1− κ2Eθth > 0, we can rewrite (A6) as
ρE = Pr
(
γSbE < ϑ0 +
K
∑
k=1
ϑkγIkE +
(
µ0γSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
µkγIkJ
)
γJE
)
, (A7)
where
ϑ0 =
θth(
1− κ2Eθth
)
QS
, ϑk =
θthQIk(
1− κ2Eθth
)
QS
, µ0 =
χθth
1− κ2Eθth
, µk =
χθthQIk(
1− κ2Eθth
)
QS
. (A8)
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Setting Z =
(
µ0γSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
µkγIkJ
)
γJE, from (A7), we have
ρE =
∫ +∞
0
...
∫ +∞
0
[
FγSbE
(
ϑ0 +
K
∑
k=1
ϑkxk + z
)
fγI1E (x1) ... fγIKE (xK) fZ (z)
]
dx1...dxKdz. (A9)
Substituting the CDF of γSbE and the PDF of γIkD provided by (1) into (A9), after some
manipulations, which yields
ρE = 1−
(
K
∏
k=1
λIkE
λIkE + λSEϑk
)
exp (−λSEϑ0)×
∫ +∞
0
exp (−λSEz) fZ (z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
. (A10)
Now, our objective is to calculate the integral I in (A10). At first, we rewrite I under the
following form:
I =
∫ +∞
0
exp (−λSEz) fZ (z) dz
=
∫ +∞
0
λSE exp (−λSEz)FZ (z) dz. (A11)
Next, we attempt to find the CDF of Z. Setting Y = µ0γSbJ +
K
∑
k=1
µkγIkJ, the CDF of Z can be
formulated by
FZ (z) = Pr
(
YγJE < z
)
=
∫ +∞
0
FY
( z
x
)
λJE exp
(−λJEx) dx. (A12)
Before calculating the CDF of Y, we note that Y is sum of the exponential RVs, i.e., µ0γSbJ
and µkγIkJ. Indeed, because γSbJ and γIkJ are exponential RVs whose parameters are λSJ and λIkJ,
respectively, hence µ0γSbJ and µkγIkJ are also exponential RVs, and their parameters are λSJ/µ0 and
λIkJ/µk, respectively. Hence, the CDF of Y can be given as
FY (y)=1− β0 exp
(−ΩSJy)− K∑
k=1
βk exp
(−ΩIkJy), (A13)
where
ΩSJ =
λSJ
µ0
, ΩIkJ =
λIkJ
µk
, β0 =
K
∏
k=1
ΩIkJ
ΩIkJ −ΩSJ
, βk =
ΩSJ
ΩSJ −ΩIkJ
K
∏
t=1,t 6=k
ΩItJ
ΩItJ −ΩIkJ
. (A14)
Substituting (A13) into (A12), we obtain
FZ (z) = 1− β0
∫ +∞
0
λJE exp
(−λJEx) exp(−ΩSJ zx)dy
−
K
∑
k=1
βk
∫ +∞
0
λJE exp
(−λJEx) exp(−ΩIkJ zx)dy. (A15)
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Using (Equation (3.324.1) of [45]) for the corresponding integrals in (A15), we arrive at
FZ (z) = 1− 2β0
√
λJEΩSJzK1
(
2
√
λJEΩSJz
)
−
K
∑
k=1
2βk
√
λJEΩIkJzK1
(
2
√
λJEΩIkJz
)
, (A16)
where K1 (.) is modified Bessel function of the second kind [45]. Then, substituting (A16) into (A11),
we obtain (A17) as
I = 1− 2β0
∫ +∞
0
λSE exp (−λSEz)
√
λJEΩSJzK1
(
2
√
λJEΩSJz
)
dz
−
K
∑
k=1
2βk
∫ +∞
0
λSE exp (−λSEz)
√
λJEΩIkJzK1
(
2
√
λJEΩIkJz
)
dz. (A17)
Next, changing variable t =
√
z, we can rewrite (A17) as
I = 1− 4λSE
√
λJEΩSJβ0
∫ +∞
0
t2 exp
(
−λSEt2
)
K1
(
2
√
λJEΩSJt
)
dt
−
K
∑
k=1
4λSE
√
ΩIkJλJEβk
∫ +∞
0
t2 exp
(
−λSEt2
)
K1
(
2
√
λJEΩIkJt
)
dt. (A18)
Applying (Equation (6.631.3) of [45]) for the corresponding integrals in (A18), we obtain
I = 1− β0 exp
(
λJEΩSJ
2λSE
)
W−1,1/2
(
λJEΩSJ
λSE
)
−
K
∑
k=1
βk exp
(
λJEΩIkJ
2λSE
)
W−1,1/2
(
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
)
, (A19)
where W−1,1/2 (.) is the Whittaker function [45].
Moreover, from (Equation (46) of [46]), we have
exp
( x
2
)
W−1,1/2 (x) = 1− x exp (x) E1 (x) , (A20)
where E1 (.) is exponential integral function [45].
Combining (A19) and (A20), after some manipulations, we obtain
I = λJEΩSJ
λSE
β0 exp
(
λJEΩSJ
λSE
)
E1
(
λJEΩSJ
λSE
)
+
K
∑
k=1
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
βk exp
(
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
)
E1
(
λJEΩIkJ
λSE
)
. (A21)
It is worth noting that to attain (A21), we used the following equation:
β0 +
K
∑
k=1
βk = 1. (A22)
Finally, substituting (A21) into (A10), we obtain (19), and finish the proof.
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